

Save
20%

Making Constitutions

Presidents, Parties, and Institutional Choice in Latin America

Gabriel L. Negretto

About the Book

This book provides the first systematic explanation of the origins of constitutional designs from an analytical, historical, and comparative perspective. Based on a comprehensive analysis of constitutional change in Latin America from 1900 to 2008 and four detailed case studies, Gabriel Negretto shows that the main determinants of constitutional choice are the past performance of constitutions in providing effective and legitimate instruments of government and the strategic interests of the actors who have influence over institutional selection. The book explains how governance problems shape the general guidelines for reform, while strategic calculations and power resources affect the selection of specific alternatives of design. It also emphasizes the importance of the events that trigger reform and the designers' level of electoral uncertainty for understanding the relative impact of short-term partisan interests on constitution writing. Negretto's study challenges predominant theories of institutional choice, and paves the way for the development of a new research agenda on institutional change.


Key Features

- Offers comparative and historical analyses of constitutional change
- Discusses the origins of major political institutions in Latin America
- Paves the way for the development of a new research agenda on institutional change

How To Order

Visit www.cambridge.org/us/9781107026520
or Call 1.800.872.7423

Enter Discount Code NEGRETTO13 at
checkout to receive the discount.



Jun 2013 | 292 pages
 14 b/w illus. | 26 tables
 Hardback | 978-1-107-02652-0
 List Price: USD 95.00
 Discounted Price: USD 72.00

Praise for the Book

“Gabriel Negretto challenges the traditional wisdom... he shows that constitutions can be as unstable as political parties and electoral behavior are in the region, thus making the choices of institutions endogenous to the political process. This work will be of interest to students of political institutions everywhere.” -*Josep Colomer, Professor, Georgetown University*

“This is a terrific book. There are very few studies of institutional choice in Latin America, and fewer still grounded in both theory and careful ontheground research.” -*Barbara Geddes, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles*

“This book explains the choices of institutions regarding presidential and congressional powers in post 1900 Latin America. Gabriel Negretto argues that parties choose rules that they expect to work to their own advantage and hence that the relative power of parties is key to understanding institutional choice. This is the most detailed examination of institutional choice that has been undertaken in Latin American politics, and perhaps in comparative politics as a whole.” -*Scott Mainwaring, Eugene P. and Helen Conley Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame*

Contents

Part I. The Logic of Constitutional Choice: Theory and Data: 1. Constitutional change and patterns of design; 2. A two-level theory of constitutional choice; 3. Determinants of variation in constitutional choice; Part II. Case Studies: The Origins of Reforms: 4. Constitutional change as a means to consolidate power: Argentina 1949; 5. Constitutional change as a strategy to redistribute power: Argentina 1994; 6. Constitutional change as a response to state failure: Colombia 1991; 7. Constitutional change as a remedy for ungovernability: Ecuador 1998.

How To Order

Visit www.cambridge.org/us/9781107026520
 or Call 1.800.872.7423

Enter Discount Code NEGRETTO13 at
 checkout to receive the discount.